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Although immigration of workers generates a positive externality on members of domestic 
pension systems, many countries are very reluctant to allow foreigners into their labor 
markets. In a political economic framework, we explain this voting outcome by considering a 
young unskilled median voter who faces – in addition to a reduction of contribution rates – 
negative effects from immigration as well. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In most countries very controversial political debates start when it comes to immigration 
issues. There are as many hopes as there are fears related to this topic. One hope is that 
immigration may help to soften the problems of ageing societies. Members of a country’s 
pension system gain from each immigrant by a positive externality which is similar to the 
introductory gift to retirees when a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system is introduced (see 
Sinn, 2000, 2001). A recent example of this debate has been the political struggle about an 
immigration law in Germany, which is one of the most rapidly ageing countries in the world. 
 
Although the foreigners’ share of the total population amount to approximately 9 percent, it 
was not until this year that Germany managed to introduce an immigration law at last. 
Previously, Germany did not actively select immigrants because it was official government 
policy to argue that Germany is simply not an immigration country. When politics became 
somewhat more realistic by the end of the 1990s, the final political debate began and lasted 
for almost 5 years before the two chambers of the German parliament (with opposing 
majorities) agreed on a joint draft. However, the law contains only few of the features of a 
modern immigration law despite recognizing that Germany is in fact an immigration country. 
The law’s main goal is a general restriction of immigration except for some groups of highly-
skilled persons (outstanding scientists and top managers). Given the fact that members of the 
German pension system gain on average €175,000 from each immigrant (Sinn, 2001), this is 
a surprising fact. By choosing a restrictive immigration policy, Germany voluntarily foregoes 
this advantage for its pension system.    
 
According to Razin and Sadka (1999, 2000) even unskilled immigrants who are net 
beneficiaries of the welfare system should be welcomed because of the positive effect of the 
externality. However, they also point out that the gain from immigration may be distributed 
unevenly between different groups in society. This argument plays a crucial role in Scholten 
and Thum (1996) and Haupt and Peters (1998) as well. In their models, the age of the native 
median voter determines a society’s preference for immigration. If, e.g., the gain from 
immigration accrues mainly to the old, they will favor immigration while younger 
generations may be more reluctant, in particular if immigration has also negative effects, such 
as falling wages.
1 A median voter in his fifties will most likely only choose an immigration 
policy with restrictions. The outcome depends, however, on the underlying pension system. 
 
The first (public) pillar of most countries’ pension systems is a pay-as-you-go system of the 
defined-benefit type (Werding, 2003), in which either the pension benefit or the replacement 
rate is fixed by law. In case of parameter changes this implies that – assuming a balanced 
budget of the pension system – contribution rates have to change endogenously. If the 
number of contributors increases and there is a given number of retirees, contribution rates 
may fall. In the following, we will investigate a pension system of the previously described 
type and consider a voting decision. Our model combines the basic ideas of two previous 
models. On the one hand, we take the more realistic defined-benefit system
2 from Scholten 
and Thum (1996) instead of the defined-contribution system in Razin and Sadka (1999). On 
the other hand, we distinguish voters by their skills as in Razin and Sadka (1999) and not 
only by their age as in Scholten and Thum (1996). Our result is no longer an unambiguous 
                                                 
1 Other explanations include, e.g., an increasing social distance (Hillman, 2002) or poor labor market 
performance of immigrants’ offspring (Krieger, 2004). 
2 In this system, pension benefits are the endogenous variable. Only few countries, such as Sweden or Poland, 
have adopted this system.   2
support for unskilled immigration. Instead some positive but restricted level of immigration is 
chosen which depends on immigration elasticities and other parameter values. The number of 
immigrants is too low compared to the social optimum.   
 
2. Basic assumptions 
 
Consider an OLG framework and let  t t t t M L H N + + ≡  be the total labor force consisting of 
t H  skilled workers,  t L  unskilled workers and  t M  unskilled immigrants
3 (if they are allowed 
into the country after a pro-immigration voting decision). The number of retirees in period t is 
1 − t N . All natives, i.e. workers and retirees, vote on immigration. Immigration policy can be 










= γ . (1) 
 
Choosing any  1 > t γ  implies that immigrants are allowed into the country. The population 
growth rate is given by the ratio of the labor force today and in the previous period, i.e. 
1 ) /( ) ( 1 1 − + + = − − t t t t t L H L H n . Furthermore, we can define the dependency rate as the ratio of 
retirees to total labor force and we assume that after one period immigrants can no longer be 
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Let us further assume that  ) , ( L H F Y =  is a linear-homogeneous production function with the 
usual properties. In flexible labor markets, wages depend on immigration as the total number 
of unskilled workers increases with each immigrant. The output after immigration may be 
written as  ) , ( M L H F Y + = , so that we have  ) ( t
H
t w γ  with  0 / > ∂ ∂ t
H
t w γ  and  ) ( t
L
t w γ  with 
0 / < ∂ ∂ t
L
t w γ . 
 
The PAYG pension system's budget equation including immigrants’ contributions is given by  
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t t w w ) 1 ( θ θ ω − + =  with  ) /( t t t t M L H H + + = θ . Here, each retiree receives the same 
pension benefit which is related to the average wage. Notice that the average wage depends 
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3 We only consider unskilled immigrants here because this group is always available and willing to enter a 
country like Germany. The number of skilled workers is relatively small and countries compete for them. They 
may therefore not be available in sufficient numbers. 
4 We assume that the dependency ratio is usually smaller than 1 when immigration takes place. So, even if the 
population is ageing, this can still be compensated by a sufficiently high immigration ratio.   3
Following Scholten and Thum (1996), we assume a fixed-replacement rate regime with 
q qt = . Therefore contribution rates have to change endogenously to changes of the 
underlying parameters, such as fertility rates, life expectancy or the number of immigrants. 
From (2), (3) and the definition of  t ω  follows   
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3. Voting outcome 
 
Each group in society has distinct preferences regarding the number of immigrants allowed 
into the country. Retirees will receive a pension of  ) ( t t q γ ω . Since q is constant and 
0 / ) ( < ∂ ∂ t t t γ γ ω , they will unambiguously lose from immigration and vote for zero 
immigration ( 1 = t γ ). When only the contribution rate adjusts to immigration, retirees do not 
participate in the gain from the positive externality. Instead, immigration will lower the 
calculation basis to which pension benefits are related. 
 
Let us assume that immigrants have the same number of children as natives and that 
immigrants' offspring have the same skill distribution as the natives' offspring.
5 If no further 
immigration takes place in the future, the ratio of skilled and unskilled workers and thus the 
average wage remains unchanged in period t+1 ( 1 + = t t ω ω ). From this follows that 
immigration today has a negative effect on the future pension benefit,  1 + t qω , as well because 
0 / ) ( 1 < ∂ ∂ + t t t γ γ ω  and  constant q = . 
 
Since immigration will always cause some gain to the domestic population, which stems from 
the positive externality generated by the increasing number of contributors, it is likely that 
further immigration will happen in the succeeding periods. If immigrants are also unskilled, 
1 + t ω  will decrease further due to  1 1 > + t γ . The negative pension effect anticipated by today’s 
workers will become even more pronounced. Qualitatively, however, there is no difference. 
Consequently in order to simplify the analysis, we will follow Scholten and Thum (1996) by 
assuming that voters are myopic. Hence,  1 + t γ  is taken as given and not considered in the 
optimization problem of the young generation, i.e. we assume  0 / 1 1 = ∂ ∂ + + t t γ ω . 
 
Keeping this in mind, skilled and unskilled workers favor the immigration policy  t γ  which 
maximizes today's net income plus the future pension benefit:  
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The first-order condition (FOC) of the workers turns out to be 
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5 This is a common assumption in models on immigration and public pensions. See Krieger (2004) for a critical 
assessment of this assumption.    4
 
where we used  t t t t t t D D γ γ γ γ / ) ( / ) ( − = ∂ ∂ . The first term of (5) describes the direct wage 
effect of unskilled immigration on domestic workers. It is positive for skilled workers and 
negative for unskilled workers since  0 / > ∂ ∂ t
H
t w γ  and  0 / < ∂ ∂ t
L
t w γ . The second term is 
positive (and larger for skilled workers) because the dependency rate (2) falls with an 
increasing number of incoming workers. This implies that the contribution rate can be 
lowered, increasing net income. The third term is negative and identical for both groups, H 
and L. Therefore immigration has more positive effects for skilled workers than for unskilled 
workers who have to face an additional negative wage effect in addition to the negative 
pension effect. Only the decrease in contribution rates benefits the unskilled. Applying the 
median-voter theorem, we can thus conclude that skilled workers favor a larger immigration 
ratio than unskilled workers, which makes the unskilled workers the median voter group 
since retirees prefer zero immigration (we exclude the possibility that one of the three groups 
in society has a majority of votes). 
 
We can now determine the optimal immigration ratio chosen by the median voter. For an 
explicit solution, we define the elasticities of wages with respect to unskilled immigration in 
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where 
L η  is the elasticity of the unskilled worker's wage and η  of the average wage ω  (both 
in period t and t+1). We will assume the immigration elasticities to be constant over time. Let 
λ  be the ratio of average wage and unskilled workers' wage: 
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and using constant immigration elasticities, we can rewrite 
L
t Vγ  from (5) as  
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Solving for  t γ  gives  
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which is positive because the elasticities, 
L η  and η , are strictly negative. Usually these 
immigration elasticities are small negative numbers (see Friedberg and Hunt, 1995), so we 
expect the numerator to be slightly larger than q in absolute terms, while the denominator is 
smaller than q if we assume the fertility rate to be close to zero and λ  not excessively high. 
Hence, the entire term is greater than 1 which implies that the median voter favors a positive 
immigration level. 
   5
In order to make the results somewhat more explicit, we will consider some real-world 
estimates for Germany. Bauer (1998, p. 214) estimates the wage elasticity of German blue 
collar workers (here used as a proxy for unskilled labor) with respect to immigration of blue 
collar workers to be -0.07. DeNew and Zimmermann (1994) find the (average) wage 
elasticity with respect to total immigration to be -0.02 which we can use as a proxy for η. By 
comparing average wages and blue collar workers' wages in the German manufacturing 
sector (taken from Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999, p. 581) we calculate λ  to be 
approximately 1.14. Finally, let the reproduction rate be 0.02 and the replacement rate 0.7, 
which is close to the German situation, then we obtain  
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In 1999 there were about 8.5 million blue and white collar workers employed in the German 
manufacturing sector. Given this information, we can calculate the desired number of 
immigrants by extracting  t M  from (1). We obtain  09 . 64 = t M  (million workers) which is 7.5 
times the number of workers in this sector. This result indicates that a voting decision on 
unskilled immigration does not lead to a too strong restriction of immigration. In fact, the 
absolute number appears to be quite high and may even exceed the number of potential 
immigrants considering entering the country.
6 Compared to the negative wage reaction, the 
positive externality benefitting the pension system is very substantial.  
 
However, our result is sensitive to parameter changes. An increase in λ  which measures the 
income dispersion leads to a decrease in the preferred number of immigrants. Unskilled 
natives are afraid that unskilled immigration will worsen their income position even further. 
This is a widespread fear in many countries although immigration elasticities are actually 
low. Therefore, it seems that people may overestimate this effect.  
 
The signs of the derivatives of the immigration ratio with respect to both immigration 
elasticities, 
L η  and η , are positive. Since the elasticities themselves are negative, this implies 
that a smaller negative wage reaction to unskilled immigration allows for a higher 
equilibrium level of immigration preferred by the median voter. Furthermore, the derivatives 
of 
Med
t γ  with respect to reproduction rate and replacement rate are showing the expected 
signs. The more native offspring there is, the fewer immigrants are needed. Higher pension 
benefits per retiree require additional contributors which may be immigrants.  
 
5. The welfare optimum 
 
Instead of a majority rule, let us suppose a government which cares about the welfare of all 
living and yet unborn future generations. Then we can simply consider a representative 
generation to describe the normative benchmark case of a utilitarian optimum, which we 
denote by 
* γ . This means that we maximize steady-state utility of an arbitrary generation by 
considering lifetime income of both skilled and unskilled workers:  
 
                                                 
6 Krieger and Sauer (2004) investigate the question whether an ageing country is attractive at all to immigrants. 
They find that the number of potential immigrants to a country like Germany is probably too low to achieve the 
desired effect on the pension system.    6
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The first-order condition, which determines the socially optimal immigration policy 
* γ , can 
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Since we are interested in the difference between the social optimum and the median voter's 
optimal choice, it suffices to investigate the condition at the point where γ  is optimally 
chosen by the median voter. This is the case when the first bracketed term in (8) becomes 
zero and thus fulfilling optimality condition (5) for L. The terms that remain thereafter 
describe the deviation of the planner's solution from the median voter's choice and correspond 
to the optimality condition of the skilled workers. Immigration is expanded beyond the 
median voter outcome as long as the benefits from higher wages and from lower contribution 
rates exceed the cost of a lower pension income received by skilled workers. We already 
know that skilled workers prefer a higher immigration ratio than unskilled workers. Hence, 
the democratically adopted immigration policy given by the median voter's choice, 
Med
t γ , is 
too small compared to the social optimum: 
* γ γ <
Med
t .  
 
This result can be explained by the fact that the welfare of a representative generation is the 
average welfare of all its members. Hence optimal immigration policy should also be 
averaged over these members' preferred levels. This approach is justified because it cannot be 





Immigration issues are very controversial topics in political debate although even unskilled 
immigration generates a substantial positive externality on the domestic population. There are 
various reasons for the reluctant support of immigration by many people. In our model, a 
negative wage reaction makes the entire population less favorable towards immigration. As 
the negative effects are often spread unevenly among different groups in society, preferred 
immigration levels differ by age and skill level of voters. Here, in particular retirees but also 
unskilled workers suffer from immigration.  
 
Under these circumstances the voting outcome may diverge from the social optimum. The 
model predicts that the utilitarian benchmark cannot be realized because the unskilled young 
median voter is affected more negatively than the representative (average) young worker. The 
voting process leads to an outcome which is too low compared to the social optimum because 
the positive externality of immigration is not fully internalized. In a political economic 
framework, Razin and Sadka’s (1999) positive view on immigration can therefore no longer 
be sustained. At the same time, Scholten and Thum’s (1996) result becomes even more 
pronounced. Not only age but also skill differences may lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
   7
Nevertheless, a rough estimate based on our result shows that the positive externality of 
immigration is quite high while the wage reaction is rather small. In terms of stabilizing the 
pension system, immigration may contribute substantially to achieving this goal. On the other 
hand, the negative wage effect is only one (exemplary) impact factor of many which may 
make natives more reluctant to accept immigration. Only the sum of several factors can 
explain outcomes such as the German immigration law.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that our model is somewhat restrictive, in the sense that there is no 
possibility to choose between skilled and unskilled immigrants who may or may not be 
allowed into the country. If the share of skilled workers in society is not too large and if a 
choice between both types of immigration is possible, the outcome of the immigration debate 
in Germany can even be better understood. If at all, only skilled workers will be affected by 
skilled immigration, whereas the other groups will gain. Hence, it is not difficult to agree on 
an outcome such as in Germany. However, due to the demographic situation in the long run 
the need for large numbers of immigrants, including unskilled workers, will become so 
pressing that a revision of today’s immigration policy will be inevitable. Organizing the 
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